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RECENT CASES.
CARRIERS-CARRIAGE OF GOODS-ACT OF GoD--A carload of chickens
stranded by the.Dayton flood was confiscated by the military authorities at
the carrier's request although the poultry was being well cared for and in no
danger of loss. Held: The negligence of the carrier in causing the appropri-
ation denies it relief from liability because of the act of God. Chicago & E.
I. R. Co. v. Collins Produce Co., 235 Fed. 857 (C: C. A., 7th Circ., 1916).
An act of God which will excuse a common carrier for loss of goods is
such an inevitable accident as cannot be prevented by human care, skill, or
foresight, but results from natural causes such as lightning, tempests, floods,
ctc. Tompkins v. Dutchess of Ulster, Fed. Cas. No. 14,o87 Atl. (U. S. 1d5i);
Carpenter v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., 64 Atl. 252 (DeL i9o6). The carrier is liable
where its negligence concurs in, or contributes to, the loss, Jones v. Minne-
apolis & St. L Ry. Co., 97 N. W. 892 (Minn. 19o4); for the act of God must
be the immediate and not the remote cause of the loss. King v. Shepherd,
Fed. Cas. No. 7804 (3 Story 349), (U. S. 1844). Some cases demand that it
be the only cause. Merritt v. Earle, 31 Barb. 38 (N. Y. i859) ; Wolf v. Amer-
ican Express Co., 43 Mo. 421 (x86).
The decisions vary as to when the carrier has been negligent in this con-
nection. Some courts hold that failure to transport goods in reasonable time
destroys the act of God defense. Alabama Great So. Ry. Co. v. Quarles &
Couturie, 4o So. i2o (Ala. i9o6) ; Green-Wheeler Shoe Co. v. Chicago, R. I.
& P. Ry. Co., io6 N. W. 498 (Iowa j9o6), the delay being considered the
proximate and concurring cause of the loss, whether the goods are perishable
or not. Bibb Broom Corn Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., io2 N. W. 709
(Minn. i9O5). Other courts hold that although a breach is caused by delay.
the carrier is nevertheless not liable for destruction caused by unforeseen
and unanticipated floods as such a consequence was not in contemplation of
the parties as a probable result of the breach. Moffatt Commission Co. v.
Union Pacific Ry. Co., 88 S. W. 117 (Mo. i9o5). So an unprecedented storm
is such a proximate cause, Hunt Bros. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. of.
Texas, 74 S. W. 60 (Texas p9o3) ; Empire State Cattle Co. v. Atchison, T.
& S. F. Ry. Co., 147 Fed. 457 (U. S. C. C.- A., Ran. i9o6); or a fire, the
carrier not being negligent with respect to it, Yazoo & M- V. Ry. Co. v.
Millsaps, 25 So. 672 (Miss. i89(j) ; General Fire Extinguisher Co. v. Carolina
& N. W. Ry. Co., 49 S. E. 2o8 (N. C. 19o4).
The carrier is negligent when it acts without proper care or foresight
in the event of an act of God, as when it unloads goods below high-water
mark on a rising river, Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Commercial Guano Co,
30 S. E. 555 (Ga. iWg8), or fails to remove cars from lowlands when warned
of flood by the Weather Bureau, Wabash R. R. Co. v. Sharpe, io7 N. W.
758 (Neb. i9o6). It must provide against an unprece4ited emergency if
it has reason to suppose it will arise, such as an extraorai'y flood, Nash-
ville & C. Ry. Co. v. David, 19 Am. Rep. 594 (Tenn. 1871) ; Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. Co. of Texas v. Davidson, 6o S. W. 278 (Texas x9oi).
Although the burden is on the shipper to show that damage was sus-
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tained, Smith v. American Express Co., 66 N. W. 479 (Mich. i896); Silver
man v. St. Louis, etc., Ry. Co., 26 So. 447 (La. 1899) ; the carrier must prove
that the damage was caused by an act of God, Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Hall,
52 S. B. 679 (Ga. i9o5); J. H. Cownie Glove Co. v. Merchants' Dispatch
Transportation Co., xo6 N. W. 749 (Iowa i9o6). If the carrier succeeds in
establishing this the shipper must then show any concurrent negligence on
the part of the carrier,. Elam v. St. Loais & S. F. Ry. Co., 93 S. W. 857
(Mo. xgo6).
CIvIL PRociDnUR-Paoaxarriox--The writ of prohibition is an extraordi-
nary legal remedy, its object being to prevent a court or tribunal of peculiar.
limited, or inferior power, from assuming jurisdiction of a matter beyond
its cognizance. It cannot be made to serve the purposes of a writ of error
to correct mistakes of a lower court in deciding questions of law within its
jurisdiction. State, ex rel., Garrison v. Brough, n13 N. E. 683 (Ohio *Qx5)..
The writ of prohibition is a discretionary one, not a writ cf right. City
of Sheridan v. Cadle, 157 Pac. 892 (Wyo. x96). It runs only to judicial
tribunals, State, ex teL, MfcAnally v. Goodier, 193 Mo. 551 (i9o6); although
it has been held to issue to prevent the holding of an illegal and unauthorized
election. Perrault v. Robinson, 158 Pac. 1o74 (Idaho 1916). It lies to pre-
vent any interference with, or vacation of, a judgment rendered at the Su-
preme Court's direction. State, ex rel., Knisely v. Board of Trustees of Y.
W. C. A., 186 S. W. 68o (Mo. i96). It will nut be granted where there is a
remedy by way of appeal, People, ex tel., N. Y. Disposal Corp. v. Freschi,
159 N. Y. S. 23 (i96) ; or to usurp the function of a certiorari, Wand v.
Ryan, 166 Mo. 646 (1902), or to control a discretition vested in an inferior
court. Com. v. Davis, 184 S. W. 1121 (i916). It has been held that the
writ lies to prevent the exercise of judicial power where there is a total
lack of jurisdiction, or where the court is proceeding in excess of its juris-
diction. State, ex rel., Buckingham Hotel Co. v. Kirmel, 183 S. W. 657
(Mo. 1916). It will not lie where the proceedings sought to be enjoined are
only ministerial. Stein v. Morrison, 75 Pac. 246 (Idaho 1904). This writ is
used very seldom in Pennsylvania, but often in New York and California.'
where there are many inferior courts. It was used in England to prevent
the encroachment of the ecclesiastical on the civil courts.
CIVIL RocEDuRE-TRIAL-CN DUCT or JU RoR-On an issue of whetheri or
not a building was set afire by sparks, a spcc*.inen of the roofing, not exposed
to the weather, was taken to the jury room and experimented upon with
matches. Held: This is not such misconduct as to require a new trial,
especially when there was nothing to show the result of the experiment.
Bradford v. Boston & M. R. R., Ix3 N. E. 1042 (Mass. x916).
The jury should decide the case upon proper reflection and deliberation
of the evidence produced at the trial and not from outside sources. City of
Fort Worth v. Young, x85 S. NV. 983 (Tex. 1916); Brunson v. Graham, 2
Yeates i66 (Pa. 1796), annotated in Loyd's Cases on Trial by Jury, page 68.
The fact that one juror tested a specimen of material submitted for inspec-
tion is not ground for reversal. McKechney v. Chicago, i6o Il. App. _44
(i9xg). It is stated that the jury can carry out experiments within the line
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of offered evidence, but cannot invade new fields, as that would be taking
evidence without the knowledge of the parties. Higgins v. Los Angeles Gas
& Electric Co., xi5 Pac. 313 (Cal. 1911). But the jurors are not allowed
during a recess to listen to and watch explanations by a witness of his testi-
mony. Wooldridge v. White, 48 S. W. io8i (Ky. i899). The fact that two
jurors were seen looking at coupling pins somewhat resembling those
involved in the trial is not misconduct. Burho v. Railway Co., 121 Minn. 326
(1913). If the jurors in viewing the premises do more than they strictly
had a right to do, it will not vitiate the verdict in the absence of anything
showing they were influenced thereby. Indianapolis v. Scott, 72 Ind. 196
(i88o). If a party knows of improper conduct by the jury, but waits until
the result of the trial is known before bringing it up, he loses what rights
he had. Ice Machine Co. v. Ice Co., 57 Fed. 898 (1893). *A statute allowing
a view of the premises by the jury does not authorize experiments with cars
before them as bearing upon the question of collision; and if authorized, it
world be within the trial court's discretion to allow it.- Smith v. St. Paul
Cy. Ry. Co., 32 Minn. 1 (1884).
Matters happening within the jury room which are prejudicial to a party
will be grounds for a new trial, as where the jury talked over matters con-
cerning the plaintiff's private affairs and one said that he was the meanest
man on earth. Jolly v. Doolittle, 149 N. W. 89o (Ia. 1914). The fact that
the jury was allowed to disperse without the consent of counsel is not ground
for a new trial in a civil case when there is no evidence of improper con-
duct. Lumber Co. v. Strickland, 144 Ga. 445 (i9i5). There must be an
injury to the appellant because of the misconduct if it is to be grounds for
reversal. Electric Co. v. Hanson, 187 S. W. 533 (Tex. iq96).
CONTRACTS-SPECIFIC P.RFORMANCE-MORTGAGE-A debtor made a con-
tract with his creditor to give a mortgage on foreign land -to secure his
indebtedness, but died without having executed the mortgage. Held: That
equity would conipel the representatives, in whom the legal title was vested,
to execute the mortgage in favor of the creditor. Re Smith, Lawrence v.
Kitson, i5 L. T. 68 (Eng. i916).
Agreements to execute mortgages upon real estate, as security for the
payment of money, are generally specifically enforced, Lowe v. Walker, gr
S. W. 22 (Ark. ioos); Morris v. McCutcheon. 62 Atl. 9)8 2 (Pa. i9o6),
especially where such agreement is entered into on the part of the obligee.
for the purpose of making an investment. It has well been pointed out that
in such a case the recovery of money damages would fall far short of accom
plishinj the purpose of the agreement. Irvine v. Armstrong, 31 Minn. 216
(j883). However, if the redress sought is not the specific thing contracted
for, viz., a mortgage, but rather mere pecuniary compensation, equity will not
interfere, in the absence of an allegation and proof of insolvency of the
debtor or that the remedy at law is not adequate. Brown v. Van Winkle
Gin and Machine Works. 39 So. 243 (Ala. i9o4).
Where the agreement is verbal, it must be clear and specific in its terms
and contain within itself such elements of certainty, that the court can give
effect, by its decree, to the real understanding of the parties, i. e., the court
should not be required, in order to give effect to the agreement, to add terms,
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wherein the agreenwnt is deficient. McClintock v. Laing, 22 Mich. 212
(1871).
It is to be noted that the land involved, in the principal case, was situ-
ated in a foreign jurisdiction, but the doctrine is quite universal, that equity.
when it has jurisdiction of the parties, will compel them to do equity in
regard to lands located outside of its jurisdiction and to perform their con-
trade in relation to such foreign res. In such a case the court acts in per-
sonata. Toiler v. Carteret, 2 Vernon 494 (Eng. 17o5); Gardner v. Ogden,
22 N. Y. 327 (i86o); British Soutlr Africa Co. v. DeBeers Consolidated
Mines, 2 Ch. Div. 502 (Eng. igio).
COPYRIGHTS-PHOTOGRAPHS-ORIGINAUTY-In an'action for an infringe-
ment of a copyright on a photograph of a scene on Fifth Avenue. in New
York City, from Forty-first to Fortieth Street, which i.ncludes the Public
Library, a demurrer to the complaint was overruled. The photograph and
its setting shows originality. "The photographer caught the meni and women
in not merely lifelike, but artistic positions, and this is especially true of the
traffic policeman. The background, taking in the building of the Engineer's
Club and the small trees on Forty-first Street, is most pleasing, and the
lights and shades are exceedingly well done.... There are other features,
such as the motor cars waiting for the signal to proceed." Pagano v. Chas.
Beseler Co., 234 Fed. 963 (1916).
Photographs did not come within the terms "print, cut, or engraving" of
the Copyright Act of 1831, 4 U. S. St. at Large 466.' Wood v. Abbott, 5
Blatch. 325 (1866). But a subsequent act included them. Section 4952 of
Revised Statutes (1873). In order, however, to come within this statute,
the photograph must be representative of the author's original conceptions-
something beyond a mere mechanical picture. Lithograph Co. v. Sarony, it i
U. S. 53 (1884). Since this decision, courts have protected copyrighted
photographs of Oscar Wilde, Lithograph Co. v. Sarony, supra; a baby ele-
phant, Schreiber, el aL, v. Thornton, 1.7 Fed. 603 (1883); an actress in a
catchy pose, Falk v. Engraving Co., 37 Fed. 202 (1888); Julia Marlowe, Falk
v. Engraving Co., 48 Fed. 262 (189i); Julia Marlowe as Parthena, Falk v.
Donaldson, 57 Fed. 32 (1893) ; an unusual picture of a woman and child, Falk
v. Butt Lithographing Co., 48 Fed. 678 (89i) ; and a woman attired in up-
to-date styles for a trade catalogue, .National Cloak and Suit Co. v. Kaufman,
189 Fed. 215 (39ii). As in the principal case, copyrighted photographs re-
vealing exceptional merit, of 'natural scenery have been protected. Bolles
v. Outing Co., 77 Fed. 966 (i897); Cleland v. Thayer, 121 Fed. 71 (1903).
To be an infringement, the copy must be of the copyrighted photograph it-
self, and it must be more than a mere following of the same general idea.
Munro v. Smith, 42 Fed. 266 (189o); Falk v. City Item Printing Co., 79
Fed. 321 (1897); National Cloak and Suit Co. v. Kaufman, .upra.
In the first motion-picture copyright to come before the court, it was held
that each individual photograph on the film would have to he copyrighted.
Edison v. Lubiri, 339 Fed. 993 (393). But this decision was reversed on
appeal to the Circuit Court. Edison v Lubin, 122 Fed. 24o (393). A film
can be protected by one copyright whether the photographs be taken at the
same place and time, or at different localities at different times. Biograph
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Co. v. Edison Manufacturing Co., i37 Fed. 262 (i9o5).
In England, the statute of 25 and 26 Vict, c. 68 (1862), gave the author
of any original "painting, drawing, or photograph," the right of copyright.
So a photograph of a lion is subject to copyright. Bolton v. London Exhibi-
tions, etc., 14 T. L. R. 55o (1898). But in some cases it is questionable who
the author of the photograph is. Nottage v. Jackson, ii Q. B. D. 627
(1883); Stackeman v. Patton, L. R. [go6] z Ch. Div. 774.
CR=Tyz ro ANImALs-SATUTORy CorsRucnoN--Cou-asC--A statute
made- unnecessary suffering'to anima'ls an offense of .cruelty, but excepted
coursing, provided the animal was not liberated in an injured condition.
Rabbits were let loose in an enclosed field, from which the" chance of escape
was negligible, then pursued and caught by dogs, which caused consid-
erable pain and suffering to the rabbits. Held: This came within ihe excep-
tion of the statute. Waters v. Mealkin, 115 L. T. 1io (Eng. xg6).
Cruelty to animals, or malicious mischief, is not an indictable offense
at common law. State v. Wheeler, 3 Vt. 344 (183); State v. Beekman, 27
N. J. L 124 (i858). But a conviction for this offense has been sustained as
being a public wrong, Respublica v. Teischer, i Dallas 335 (Pa. 1788); Com-
monwealth v. Taylor, 5 Binney 297 (Pa. 1872j, as a nuisance, United States
v. Jackson, 4 Cranch. C. C. 183 (1834), and on general moral principles,
People v. Stakes, i Wheeler Cr. Cas. iii (N. Y. 182).
Now, however, statutes make cruelty to animals an offense in practically
every jurisdiction. Several of these make it an offense to "needlessly muti-
late and kill." These terms have been held to mean "simply an act done
without any useful motive, in a spirit of wanton' cruelty, or for the merc
pleasure of destruction." Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456 (i88x). The act of
fighting dogs comes within these terms, Commonwealth v. Thornton, 113
Mass. 457 (1873), as freeing a captive fox to be chased and mangled by
dogs, Commonwealth v. Turner, 145 Mass. 26 (1887), or cutting a cock's
comb for fighting, Murphy v. Manning, 2 Ex. Div. 3o7 (Eng. Y877), or dis-
horning cattle, Ford v. Wiley, 23 Q. B. D. 203 (Eng. i889), or shooting and
wounding pigeons in marksmanship practice. Paine v. Bergh, i Cy. Ct. Rep.
i6o (N. Y. )874); State v. Porter, 112 X. C. 887 (j893); Waters v. People,
23 Colo. 33 (j896). Contra, State v. Bogardus, 4 Mo. App. 215 (1877). It
is also said that the object of such statutes is to protect animals from wilful
or wanton cruelty and not from incidental pain and suffering. Hodge v.
State, ii Lea 528 (Tenn. 1883). So an indictment alleging ill-treatment and
abuse of certain cocks is not sufficient when the accused only -fought the
cocks, for then the injury is incidental. Morrow's Case, 26 Pitts. Leg. Jour.,
0. S. .. 6. (P4- 1879). A conviction for "wantonly and cruelly ill-treating,
etc.," va_ upleld when marksmen in practice shot and wounded pigeons.
Commoni vealth v. Lewis. 7 Pa. Co. Ct. 558 (i89o). But this decision was
reversed on appeal Commonwealth v. Lewis, 140 Pa. 26! (i89i).
Facts similar to those-of the principal case were held not to be within a
statute prohibiting baiting animals in Pitts v. Millar, L R. 9 Q. B. 38o (Eng.
x874). The decisions in these cases depend to a great extent upon the
court's personal view of the particular circumstances, and one case can
hardly be taken as a precedent for another.
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E ITY-A oRBITRAT]ON-ENFORCEMENT oF AGRELMENT-By an agreement.
the defendant was to pay the plaintiff pro rata from moneys he should col-
lect, and the parties further agreed that if any differences arose, they were
to be referred to arbitrators, whose decision would be final. Hxdd: The
stipulation for arbitration was unconnected 'with and independent from the
other part of the contract and is not a condition precedent.to 4n action upon
the principal contract. Brocklehurst & Potter Co. v. Marsch 113 N. -.- 646
(Mass. 1916).
It is universal law that equity will not specifically enforce an agreement
to arbitrate or to ,,ame arbitrators. Street v. Rigby, 6 Ves. Jr. 818 (Eng.
i8o2); Terrel v. Ten 1, 253 Mo. 167 (9i13). But where the broken agree-
ment for arbitration is part of a contract relating to land. a court of equity
may grant relief by assuming the arbitrator's duties. Johnson v. Conger, 14
Abb. Pr. 195 (N. Y. 1861); Coles v. Peck, 96 Ind. 333 (1884); Black v.
Rogers, 75 Mo. 44i (i8&z).
A mere agreement to arbitrate future differences is revocable and bring-
ing suit before the award is a revocation. Needy v. Insurance Co., 197 Pa.
46o (igox); Crilly v. Rinn Co., 135 111. App. 18 (I9O7). But a stipulation,
whether express or by necessary implication, that arbitration be a condition
precedent to the right to sue is irrevocable. Hamilton v. Insurance Co. 136
U. S. 242 (1889); Parsons v. Ambos, 48 S. E. 696 (Ga. 194); Davisson v.
Land & Water Co., 6 Pac. 88 (Cal. i9o8). If the agreement is to arbitrate
all questions of law and fact, it is void, being against public policy as an
attempt to oust the court's jurisdiction; but if it relates to a particular issue
of fact and leaves the ultimate decision to the courts, it is valid. Jones v.
Power Co. 92 S. C. 263 (1912). The mere provision for arbitration does
not make it a condition precedent. Reed v. Insurance Co., z, Mass. 572
(885); Anderson v. Odd Fellows, go Adt. ioo7 (N. J. 1914). It must be
more than a collateral undertaking. Akt., etc., Kompagniet v. Red. Atlanten,
232 Fed. 403 (i916). If. however, a breach of the agreement to arbitrate
cannot be pleaded in bar to an action on the principal contract, it will sup-
port a separate action. Hamilton v. Insurance Co., 137 U. S. 370 (i89o).
If the arbitration stipulation is a condition precedent, a defendant who
repudiated it cannot rely upon it in an action by the other party. Willett v.
Smith, 214 Mass. 494 (i913); Jureidini v. Insurance Co., L. R. [i9i5] App.
Cas. 499. And it is not necessary that the other party demand or offer to
arbitrate after repudiation. Calhoun, et al., v. Pederson, 85 Wash. 630 (i915).
If all complaints are to be referred to arbitrators whose award is a condi-
tion precedent, the other party must be" notified of any complaints, if the
agreement is to be effective. Symms-Powers Co. v. Kennedy, 146 N. IV. 57o
(S. D. 1914).
EvmnE-;E-OTHER Acrs-In a prosecution for assault, wherein the
defense was an alibi, the prosecution introduced evidence tending to prove
that the accused had visited the prosecutor's shop a fortnight before,
and there criminally destroyed some of the latter's goods. Held: The
evidence was admissible, on the ground that it tended to prove, the iden-
tity of the accused. People v. Thau, 113 N. E. 556 (N. Y. 1916).
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As a general rule, any evidence tending to prove the commission of
other separate and distinct crimes or offenses is not admissible purely for
the purpose of proving the commission of the particular crime charged
in the indictment. Commonwealth v. Wilson. 186 Pa. 1 (i898); Simpson
v. State, 85 S. W. 16 (Tex. 1905); People v. Grutz, 212 'N. Y. 72 (1914).
The foregoing is but a different way of saying that in all cases, be they
civil or criminal, the evidence must be confined to the point -in issue. To
admit evidence of other offenses would require the trial of matter col-
lateral to the main issue; Fish v. United States, 215 Fed. 544 (1914),
would put an undue burden upon the accused, by requiring him to stand
ready to defend his whole past record, Farris v. People, 129 111 521 (j889),
and would often prejudice the jury against him. Fish v. United States,
.Tupra.
There are, however, several well-recognized exceptions to the general
rule as formulated above. People v. Molineux, j68 N. Y. 264 (igoi).
Evidence, although tending to prove other offenses, may be admitted to
prove, first, intent, where a particular intent constitutesan essential element
of the crime charged, United States v. Snyder, 14 Fed.-554 (882); Com-
monwealth v. Farmer, 218 Mass. 507 (1914); State v. Corcoran. 143 Pac.
453 (Wash. -1914), second, motive, State v. Williamson, io6 Mo. 162
(89) ; Thompson v. United States. 144 Fed. 74 (1906), third, the absence
of mistake or accident. Goersen v. Commonwealth, 99 Pa. 388 (1882),
fourth, a preconcerted scheme or plafi, Goersen v. Commonwealth, .supra,
fifth, the identity of the accused, and it was on the basis of this last ex-
ception that the principal case was decided. United States v. Boyd, 45 Fed.
851 (189o); Frazer v. State, 34 N. E. 817 (Ind. 1893); Davis Y. State, 44
S. W. io99 (Tex. 1898).
Furthermore, if the evidence tends directly to prove the crime charged,
it is not rendered incompetent because it also tends to -prove the commis-
sion of another crime. State v. Adams. 20 Kan. 3i (878); State v.
Madigan, 57 Minn. 25 (1894) ; Glover v. People, 204 II. 170 (1903).
EV1DENE-WITxrSS--A'ERSE INTEiEST-In a suit by an'administrator,
the defendants relied on a gift inter vivos. Held: The defendant was not
a competent witness. Katz v. Smith, 98 Atl. 6o8 (Pa. x9i6).
The modern source of the rule that one having an adverse interest
cannot testify against a testator's estate was -laid down by Lord Romilly
in Grant v. Grant, 34 Beav. 623 (1865), where the proposition was advanced
that. while the evidence is admissible there must be corroborative proof.
to support it. This was followed in Down v. Ellis, 35 Beav. 578 (i865);
Hartford v. Power, Ire. R. 3 Eq. 62 0869); Hill v. Wilson. L. R. 8
Ch. App. 888 (1873). In 1883 Sir George: Jessel repudiated the rule of the
above cases, alleging it to be a question for the jury whether they believed
Ithe witness. In re Finch, L. R. 23 Ch. Div. 267 (1883). Lord Brett later
followed In re Finch. Gandy v. MacCaulay, L. R. 31 Ch. Div. i (i883).
In 1886 Lord Romilly's rule was laid down in Ireland. In re Harnett,
L. R. Ire. 543 (z886). Canada follows Lord Romilly's rule, Rankin v.
McKenzie, 3 Man. 323 (r885). Ex parte Simpson, x New. B. 142 (1874)
Contra.
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In United States the question is generally settled by statutes, the
evidence being generally inadmissible, while some statutes are mQdeled on
Grant v. Grant, .rupra. See Wigmore, Evidence, Sec. 488, for a compilation
of the statutes.
In Pennsylvania a party in interest could not testify at all, Graves v.
Griffin, 7 Harris 176 (Pa. i8s2) until the Act of April 15, s86g, which
allowed parties in interest to testify except against a decedent's estate.
This was affirmed by the Act of 1887, P. L, p. ix8.
At early common law no one having an adverse interest could testify.
15 Ja. B. R, 2 Role's Abridgement 658, and a legatee could not be a
witness to prove the wili. Dowdeswell v. Nott, 2 Vern. 317 (1694).
SURETYSHIP-HUSBAND AND WiF.-DisABiL1TEs-In order to give se-
curity for a debt of her husband's, a wife conveyed her individual lands
to him and then joined with him in a mortgage to the creditor. The
creditor knew of the transaction. Held: The mortgage is void under a
statute prohibiting either husband or wife from becoming surety. Vinegar
Bend Lumber Co. v. Leftwich, 72 So. 538 (Ala. 1916).
While at common law a married woman could not become surety,
statutes authorizing her to contract as though unmarried have been inter-
preted to include the power to guarantee her husband's debts. Hackfeld &
Co. v. Metcalf, 20 Hawaiian 47 (i9o); Royal v. Southerland, 168 N. C.
405 (1915). They have also been held to give her the power to pledge
her personal property; in some states even in the face of a statutory pro-
hibition like that in the principal case. Just v. State Savings Bank, 132
Mich. 6w (0o3); Eagle v. Wright, I1o S. W. 361 (Ky. i9o8); Eagle v.
New York Life Insurance Co., 48 Ind. App. 284 (ignx). For citations
showing conflict as to whether a pledge of personal property is valid
under such a prohibition, see note 87A. S. R. 5o3 and 13 R. C. L., p. x3oo;
also Herr v. Reinoehl. 209 Pa. 483 (19o4).
The courts generally endeavor to determine whether or not the effect
of the transaction was an evasion of the disability created by the statute,
and if it was it will be set aside. Sibley v. Robertson, 212 Pa. 24 (19o5);
Third National Bank v. Tierney, 128 Ky. 836 (igo8). Thus a contract
of a wife to indemnify the surety of her husband was held to be within
the statutory prohibition, the distinction under the Statute of Frauds be-
tween an indemnitor and a surety not applying. Bank of Tifton v. Smith,
142 Ga. 663 (1914). So also. where a wife mortgages her separate estate
to secure a debt of her husband's, she becomes a surety for the debt,
Red River Bank v. Brag, 132 S. W. 968 (Tex. 19n1), and the mortgage
is void. Indianapolis Brewing Co. v. Bekuke, 41 Ind. App. 288 (i9o7);
Gross v. Whitley, 128 Ga. 79 (9o7). Pennsylvania is contra, however.
Righter v. Livingston, 215 Pa. 28 (z9o6). Nor is a mortgage on lands
held by husband and wife as tenants by the entireties valid when given
to secure the husband's debt, Webb v. The John Hancock Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 162 Ind. 66 (i9o3), unless, of course, it is for purchase money.
Kelly v. York, 183 Ind. 628 (1915), or for money loaned both of them.
American Freehold Land? Mortgage Co. v. Thornton, io8 Ala. 258 (189S).
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A wife does not become surety under these statutes when she re-
leases her dower by signing a mortgage on her husband's land for his
debt. Crawford v. Hazebrigg, 117 Ind. 63 0888). See, however, Titcher
v. Griffiths. 216 Mass. 174 (191.3). where it was held that she had in
such a case the rights of a surety against her husband.
MASTER AND SERVANT-WORK31EN'S COMPENsATIoN AcT-&Ep.oYx -
The owner of a team of horses was killed while hauling lumber for a
lumber company. The driver was-paid so much per thousand; the dura-
tion of the employment was indefinite, and the lumber company exercised
some control over the hauling. Held: The driver was an employee and not
an independent contractor. Tuttle v. Embury-Martin Lumber Co., 158 N.
W. 875 (Mich. 1916).
The question of whether the relationship existing is that of employer
and employee, or whether the injured party was an independent con-
tractor, is largely a question of fact. Jones v. Penwyllt Brick Co., 6 B.
W. C. C. 492 (Eng. 1913). But if any element is controlling in deter-
mining the relation, it is the extent to which the one undertaking the
work is subject to, or is free from, the control of the person for whom
it is done. Beck v. Hill and Sons, 8 B. W. C. C. 592 (Eng. 1915); State
ex rel. v. District Court, i5o N. W. 211 (Minn. 1914). Another test em-
ployed is whether the contract is for personal service, or whether some other
person could be substituted by the person contracting to do the work.
Chisholm v. Walker and Co., 2 B. W. C. C. 261 (Scot. i9o8); Western
Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, i59 Pac. 721 (Cal. i916).
The relationship of employer and employee may not exist originally,
but the independent contractor may perform such services as make him an
employee at the time of the accident. Powley v. Vivian & Co, 169 App.
Div. (N. Y.) i70 (x9iS).
The employee may be engaged by more than one person at the same
time to do similar work, -and this does not destroy the relationship of
employer and employee. In such a case, it has been held that he was
the employee of the person on whose premises he was injured. Western
Metal Supply Co. v. Pillsbury, 156 Pac. 491 (Cal. i916).
Some cases are very liberal in construing the compensation acts and
in deciding, that the relationship is that of employer and employee. It
has been said that the only cases to be considered as controlling in decid-
ing this question are cases decided under the identical principle represented
by the compensation acts. In re Rheinwold, 153 N. Y. S. 598 (1915). Cf.
Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, supra.
Under its facts, the principal case is in accord with the trend of
decisions under compensation acts. Congreve v. Alberta Coal Mining Co.,
7 B. W. C. C. io2o (Canada 1912); Ryan v. County Council, 8 B. W.
C. C. 4r5 (Ireland 1914); Thompson v. Twiss, 97 AtL 328 (Conn. x9'6).
MASTER AND S.RVANT-NVORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT--COURSE OF
EMPLOYmENT-An insurance agent was injured by the overturning of an
automobile in which he was riding, at the invitation of a prospective cus-
tomer, in order to explain the policy. Held: The injury did not arise out
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of the employment. Hewitt v. Casualty Co., 113 N. E. 572 (Mass. x91fi).
Many compensation acts, unlike the Pennsylvania Act of June 2, 1915,
P. L. 7.38. provide that the injurv must arise out of and in the course
of the employment. The leading English and American cases on the sub-
ject may be found in 64 UNIv. OF PENNA. I.. REv. 108, 326, 637 and 63&
Since that time many cases have been decided, and it would be a hopeless
task to attempt to reconcile them all.
It has been held that where an employer lends his employee to a
third person, and injury results while working for the third person, the
employee may recover from his original employer. Dale v. Saunders Bros.,
157 N. Y. S. xo62 (1916). However, some courts take the view that
such injury is not in the course of the original employment. Bayer v.
Bayer, 158 N. IV. 1o9 (Mich. z916). Cases where the employee is the
subject of personal assault present difficulties. If the employment is at-
tended with risk of personal assault, then the injury from such assault
is considered to have been received in the course of and to have arisen
out of the employment. Walther v. American Paper Co., 98 At. 264
(N. J. 1916) (watchman); State ex rel v. District Court, 158 N. W. 713
(Minn. i9g6) (bartender). The same result is reached if the assault is
due to the employee's desire to have the employer's service correctly per-
formed. In re Heitz, 112 N. - 750 (N. Y. x916). But, in general, if
there is no peculiar risk, the injury does not arise out of the employment
and is not compensable. Schmall v. Weisbrod and Hess Brewing Co, 97
Atl. 723 (N. J. 1916) (collector).
If the employee is injured while doing work for the employer which
he is not required to do, his injury is received in the course of the
employment. Hartz v. Hartford Faience Co., 9 Atl. 1o2o (Conn. i916).
But if he does it in disobedience of express orders, he is not acting in the
course of employment. Bischoff v. American Car & Foundry Co., 57
N. W. 34 (Mich. igi6). The employee is still within the course of em-
ployment, if he is injured while aiding another injured employee engaged
in the same operation. Waters v. William J. Taylor Co., m12 N. E. 727
(N. Y. xgx6).
The decisions are not in harmony on the question as to whether the
employee is injured in the couise of the employment, when he is injured
while going from place to place. If the employment requires the employee
to go from place to place, he is generally held to be in the course of the
employment while so doing. Kunze v. Detroit Shade Tree Co., 158 N.
IV. 5sx (Mich. 1gj6). But cf. De Voe v. N. Y. State Rwys., 113 N. E.
256 (N. Y. xw6).
PARTisHIp--DissoLuTroN;-NEw FIRmn-Where a partner on dissolu-
tion, formed a new firm, taking over the assets and assuming all liabilities
of the old firm, and the new firm became bankrupt, it was held that debts
due from the old firm could be proved against the new firm. In re
Stringer. 234 Fed. 45A (N. Y. 1916).
To render a new firm liable for debts of an old firm, an express agree-
ment is generally necessary. La Montague v. Bank of N. Y.. 88 N. Y. S.
21 (1904). This agreement will be implied from the purchase of a retir-
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ing partner's share. Beverly v. Tarns, 17 Pa. 485 (1851). A misrep-
resentation as to the amount of the debts invalidates the agreement.
Trotter v. Rotan, 5o Tex. Civ. App. 448 (igo8). Slight evidence will
support the finding of an agreement by the jury. Shaw v. McGregory,
io5 Mass. 96 (i87o). This agreement does not fall within the Statute of
Frauds. Stayer v. Jones, 32o Okla. 713 (1912). It has been held that
the creditor cannot sue on this agreement, not being in privity thereto,
Hicks v. Wyatt, 23 Ark. s5 (i86i), but he can sue in Massachusetts.
Shaw v. McGregory, s'upra.
There is a split of opinion on the question whether the creditor has
his election as to whom to sue after notice of the agreement. Some courts
follow the early English rule of Oakley v. Pasheller, 4 Clark 2 F. 207
(1836), that the original firm is, after notice to the creditor, a surety.
Wiley v. Temple, 85 I11. App. 69 (1899). Others follow the later English
case of Swire v. Redman, L. R. i Q. B. 536 (1876), overruling Oakley
v. Pasheller, supra, that until assent by the creditor, the latter has his
election. Weil v. Jaeger, 73 111. App. 266 (1899). The old and new firms
are surety and debtor infer se. Strong evidence is necessary to show
assent by the creditor. Nickerson v. Russell, 172 Mass. 584 (899).
It has been held that a novation was necessary. Anniston v. Cheyney,
114 Ala. s36 (084).
PRoPF"RTY-ADVESE POSSESSION-COLOR ,F TiTm -CONSTRUCTIVE Pos-
sassioN-Trespass action to recover land claimed under color of title
and adverse possession. Held: Adverse possession under color of title is
not broken by purchase of an outstanding claim. Constructive possession
extends to entire tract of land specified in deed. Alsworth, -et al., v.
Richmond Cedar Works, 89 S. E. ioo8 (N. C. 1916).
The case is a clear exposition of the better, opinion on the points
discussed.
The law expressed, that adverse possesion under color of title for
the statutory period gives complete title, is, in its definitions of the
terms, in accord with the weight of opinion. In general, to have color of
title, possessor must have something in writing limiting his claim, Thomp-
son v. Burkhaus, 79 N. Y. 93 (i879); Deffeback v. Hawk, ii5 U. S.
392 (1885). In Hollinshead v. Nauman, 45 Pa. 140 (1863), writing was
held to be unnecessary and in a few exceptional cases such as posses-
sion by "descent cast." Peadro v. Carriker, 168 Il1. 57o (897), or by judg-
ment. Keener v. Union Pac. R. Co, 31 Fed. 126 (x88i), or by statutory
provision. Kron v. Hinson, 53 N. C. 347 (86i), writing has been held un-
necessary. A defective or void deed is good color of title, Beaver v.
Taylor, I Wall. 637 (U. S. Sup. Ct. 1863); Maring v. Meeker, 263 IlL 136
(1914).
The general rule is that purchase of an outstanding claim by an adverse
possessor does not interrupt the continuity of the possession. Owens v.
Myers, 2 Pa. 134 (1852) ; Elder v. McClaskey, 7o Fed. 529 (1895) though
there is one case contra to this rule, Croan v Joyce, 3 Bush 454 (Ky. 1867).
Generally constructive possession under color of title is co-extensive
RECENT CASES
with the claim of the color of title, Montoya v. Gonzales, 232- U. S. 375
(1914), but in recent cases this doctriie has been limited where the tract
of land described in the color of title is too large, Louisville & Nash-
.ville R. Co. v. Land Co., 82 Miss. i8o (i903), or where two tracts are
not contiguous, Georgia Pine Co. v. Holton, 94 Ga. 551 (1894). Where a
tract of land under one color of title has been divided into lots, pos-
session of one or more lots extends constructively to the entire.tract, Gregg
v. Forsyth, 24 How i79 (U. S. Sup. Ct. i86o); Kerr v. Nicholas, 88 Ala.
346 (x88g), which expresses the general rule, although Gainus v. Bow-
man, 1o Heisk. 6oo (Tenn. 1873) is contra.
PROPERTY-WVILLS-CoNsTRUcTION-DETERmiINATiON OF BENEFICIARY AT
DATE OF WILl-By a trust deed, the income of a fund was given to the
donor's son, and after the ton's death to his widow. The son's wife pre-
deceased him and he remarried. Held: "Widow" in-the deed must be inter-
preted "wife." and the second wife is not entitled. 'In re Solms' Estate, 98
L. 596 (Pa. gxi6).
It is difficult to formulate a general rule as to the construction of a
will where the word "wife" or "widow" is used. Every will must be inter-
preted in the light of all the circumstances of the case, and as has been
well said: "No will has a brother." Meeker v. Draffin. 22 Ann.'Cas. 930
(N. Y. 1gx). In general, a devise to the "wife" of a designated married
man is a devise to the wife existing at the time of the making of the
will. Van Brunt v. Van Brunt, ig N. E. 6o (N. Y. 1888); Van Syckel
v. Van Syckel, 26 AtI. 156 (N. J. 1893). A 'devise to the "widow" of a
designated married man has a broader application, and is a devise to such
wife as may survive him. Swallow v. Swallow's Adm., 27 N. J. Eq. 278
(1876); Crocheron v. Fleming, 70 Atl. 691 (N. J. i9o8).
These rules of interpretation are by no means inflexible, and the.
slightest circumstance tending to indicate a contrary intention suffices tu
alter them. If the will says "wife" and the intention appears to be t'
devise to any wife, it will be interpreted "widow." In re Harris, 136 N. Y.
S. 711 (xgr), but see dissenting opinion. The tendency is to limit the
will to the wife at the time of the will, if "wife" is mentioned. Davis v.
Kerr, 38 N. Y. S. 387 (1896). When the will mentions the "widow," any-
thing which shows that the wife at the time of the will was contemplated
by the testator, suffices to limit the devise to her. This has been done
where the "widow" referred to was a niece of the testator. Anschutz
v. Miller, 81 Pa. 212 (1876). And where the will stipulated that the
"widow" should take only so long as she remained widow, it was inter-
preted to refer to the wife at the time of the will. Beers v. Narramore,
22 Adt. xo6i (Conn. 1891).
If the will mentions the "wife" and marriage is contemplated but not
yet celebrated, the person described as "wife" cannot take. Steen v;
Steen, s$- Atl. 675 (N. J. 19o5). The same rule applies if the parties
thought they were married, but the marriage was not legaL Collard v.
Collard, 67 AtL 190 (N. J. 1907). In case a divorce has followed the willt
if the divorced wife is referred" to as "wife," she is entitled. Jones'
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Estate, 211 Pa. 364 (go5); In re Brown's Estate, 117 N. W. 26o (Ia. 19o8);
Ii; re Gruendike's Estate, s8 Pac. 1057 (Cal. I9o8). 'But see, contra.
Lansing v. Haynes, 54 N. W. 699 (Mich. z893).
SURxTySHI -TRilNATION OF GUARANTY-CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES-
Defendant guaranteed payment of past debts and future _purchases, of
a dry goods store, in consideration of the sale of dry goods to store on
credit by plaintiff. Plaintiff, with all the other creditors of the store, three
da-s later took over the rhan agement of the- store in informal bankruptcy
proceedings. Held: The guaranty only applied to purchases by the store as
a going concern. Hence the guaranty failed by lack of consideration, as
plaintiff never acted upon guaranty offer, Western Dry Goods Co. v.
Hamilton, x59 Pac. 373 (Wash. z916).
The case is fully in accord with the better law on the subject. For-
bearance to sue is good consideration if for a definite time. Traders
National Bank v. Parker, i3o N. Y. 415 (1892); McMicken v. Safford, 197
Ill. 540 (i9o2), or in some cases for a reasonable time, Moore v. McKenney,
83 Me. So (i8go). This must be carried out, however, Cobb v. Page, 27
Pa. 469 (1851). Consideration of previous sales is invalid, Hedden v.
Seheblin, 1o4 S. W. 887 (Mo. i9o7); Standard Supply Co. v. Finch, 147
N. C. io6 (igo8). However, if there is any good consideration guaranties
may be retrospective, People v. Lee, 1o4 N. Y. 442 (i887); Barnes v. Cush-
ing, 168 N. Y. &42 (10oi).
Generally a guaranty is deemed a unilateral contract accepted by per-
formance, but the Federal courts require notice to guarantor of acceptance,
Douglas v. Reynolds, 7 Pet. 13 (U. S. 1833); Davis v. Wells, 104 U. S.
165 (881), except where the proposal of a guaranty comes from the cred-
itor making the guaranty itself an acceptance, MacFarlane v. Wadhams,
z65 Fed. 987 (C. C. Wis. i9o8), or where a valuable consideration exists
apart from creditor to debtor, Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. Richards, uiS
U. S. 524 (i885). The riajority of the State courts do not require notice,
Nat. Bank of Poughkeepsie v. Phelps, 86 N. Y. 484 (i8o), except a few
that follow the Federal courts, Bishop v. Eaton, 161 Mass. 496 (1894).
Any material change of circumstances is generally held- to relieve the
surety of all obligaion. Rankin v. Tygard, 198 Fed. ;95 (U. S. C. C. 1912).
A surety cam insist on literal performance of the contract, Whitcher v.
Hall, 5 Barn. & Cr. 269 (i86). In Young v. Amer. Bonding Co., 228 Pa.
373 (igio), a klistinction was drawn between private sureties and bonding
companies for hire, permitting the latter a less strict right to literal per-
formance. The guaranty does not extend to the successor of debtor, Coan v.
Partridge, 98 N. Y Supp. 570 (igo6), even when creditor does not know of
the change in debtor, Manhattan Gaslight Co. v. Ely, 39 Barb. 374 (N. Y.
1863). But see In re Cinque, 1o9 Fed. 455 (U. S. C. C. 1901), where it
was held that a secret understanding whereby one partner continued in busi-
ness under the firm name did not relieve the guarantor of the firm's purchhses
from liability.
For further discussion of these points see 6o U. oF Px.,xA. LAW RLVEW,
219, 522, 597.
